CC hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition
Baseline the EFI System Partition and hunt malicious EFI binaries such as ESPecter, BlackLotus, Bootkitty, and Glupteba by mounting the ESP, hashing and verifying boot loaders, scanning with YARA, and flagging anomalous non-EFI files or out-of-band bootloader changes. Use during proactive threat hunts for firmware/bootkit persistence (MITRE ATT&CK T1542.003) or when investigating suspected UEFI-level compromise that survives OS reinstall.
Baseline the EFI System Partition and hunt malicious EFI binaries such as ESPecter, BlackLotus, Bootkitty, and Glupteba by mounting the ESP, hashing and…
As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegescripts/agent.py:12Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)sudo python3 esp_bootkit_hunter.py --esp /mnt/esp --baseline base…256
code literal -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegescripts/agent.py:13Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)sudo python3 esp_bootkit_hunter.py --device /dev/sda1 --mount --yara bootkit.yar
code literal -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:180Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)sudo dd if=/dev/sda1 of=/evidence/esp_$(hostname)_$(date +%F).img bs=4M conv=noerror,sync
security skill
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 31 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2990 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 442: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 19 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 31 items
- +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.