CC hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement
Hunt for DCOM-based lateral movement (MITRE ATT&CK T1021.003) by detecting abuse of MMC20.Application, ShellBrowserWindow, and ShellWindows COM objects via Sysmon Event ID 1/3 correlation, WMI event analysis, and RPC endpoint mapper traffic on port 135. Use when investigating suspicious mmc.exe/dllhost.exe child processes, building T1021.003 detections, or auditing DCOM exposure during purple-team exercises.
Hunt for DCOM-based lateral movement (MITRE ATT&CK T1021.003) by detecting abuse of MMC20.Application, ShellBrowserWindow, and ShellWindows COM objects via…
As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: failures and branches, running it twice
How to improve
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 10
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 10
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# DCOM Lateral Movement Detection API Reference
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:8Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Lateral Movement | TA0008 | Tactic covering movement between networked systems |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:9Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Windows Management Instrumentation | T1047 | WMI often correlated with DCOM lateral movement |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:11Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## DCOM COM Objects Abused for Lateral Movement
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:60Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# MMC2…ion lateral movement
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)description: 'Hunt for DCOM-based lateral movement (MITRE ATT&CK T1021.003) by detecting
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:46Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Hunting for DCOM Lateral Movement
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:48Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)> **Authorized Testing Disclaimer**: The offensive techniques and attack simulations described in this skill are intended exclusively for authorized penetration testing, red team engagements, purple t
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:52Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) enables remote execution of COM objects across a network using RPC. Adversaries abuse specific DCOM objects -- MMC2…ion (CLSID {49B2…-9B -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:56Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Proactively hunting for lateral movement in Active Directory environments where DCOM is enabled
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 7200 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/ - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 30Running it twice. 8 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 7200 tokens
- 100Steps. 30 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 411: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 18 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (17 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.