SKILLEMALL.ai

CC hunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logs

Hunts for LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) abuse, mapped to MITRE T1218, by analyzing endpoint process-creation logs for suspicious execution patterns of legitimate Windows system binaries used for malicious purposes. Use when reviewing endpoint process telemetry for LOLBins-based defense evasion or building detections for signed-binary proxy execution.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 778 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Hunts for LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) abuse, mapped to MITRE T1218, by analyzing endpoint process-creation logs for suspicious execution patterns…

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, failures and branches, progress reporting

ProcedurePeople and hiringtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
74
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:40
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | wmiprvse.exe | cmd.exe | WMI-based lateral movement |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:101
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      3. Collect process memory dump for malware analysis

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 24 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1778 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 361: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 12 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 24 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.