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CB hunting-for-spearphishing-indicators

Hunt for spearphishing campaign indicators across email logs, endpoint telemetry, and network data to detect targeted email attacks.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 684 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Hunt for spearphishing campaign indicators across email logs, endpoint telemetry, and network data to detect targeted email attacks.

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: failures and branches, running it twice

AnalyzerPeople and hiringAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
96
Quality 40%
78
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Failures and branches w 10
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 4

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 4
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:48
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      r"https?://[^/]*login[^/]*\.",   # Credential harvesting
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:38
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Atomic Red Team Tests: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:46
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Trace lateral movement and privilege escalation paths
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:116
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      3. **Scenario 3**: Credential harvesting link as SharePoint notification

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_f3"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 21 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 684 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 132: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 8 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.