SKILLEMALL.ai

CC hunting-for-t1098-account-manipulation

Hunts for MITRE ATT&CK T1098 account manipulation - shadow admin creation, SID history injection, group membership changes, and credential modifications - by analyzing Windows Security Event Log IDs 4738, 4728, 4732, 4756, 4670, and 5136. Use when investigating suspected privilege persistence in Active Directory, after detecting anomalous group/credential changes, or during incident response to trace account tampering.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 495 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Hunts for MITRE ATT&CK T1098 account manipulation - shadow admin creation, SID history injection, group membership changes, and credential modifications - by…

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ProcedurePeople and hiringtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:38
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      MITRE ATT&CK T1098 (Account Manipulation) covers adversary actions to maintain or expand access to compromised accounts, including adding credentials, modifying group memberships, SID history injectio

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 8 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 495 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 422: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 10 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 8 items
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.