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CD performing-cve-prioritization-with-kev-catalog

Fetch and parse the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, enrich it with EPSS scores and CVSS metrics, and build a multi-factor prioritization engine and report that ranks CVE remediation by real-world exploitation evidence and BOD 22-01 deadlines. Use when triaging a vulnerability backlog, deciding patch order across many CVEs, or building an automated KEV+EPSS prioritization workflow.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 2 347 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Fetch and parse the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, enrich it with EPSS scores and CVSS metrics, and build a multi-factor prioritization…

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ProcedurePeople and hiringMedia and videotype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
87
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 13

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 13
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:10
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Ransomware-Associated CVEs | [N] |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:22
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | CVE | Vendor | Product | CVSS | EPSS | Ransomware | Due Date | Status |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:73
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | `knownRansomwareCampaignUse` | string | "Known" or "Unknown" ransomware association |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:92
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "ransomware": entry["knownRansomwareCampaignUse"],
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:105
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      """Sort KEV matches by priority: overdue > ransomware > due date."""
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:110
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      if entry["ransomware"] == "Known":
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:126
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ransomware = [m for m in matches["kev_matches"] if m["ransomware"] == "Known"]
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:21
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Ransomware-associated (2025) | 24 |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:32
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      4. Check if ransomware-associated in KEV
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:70
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **Known Ransomware Campaign Use**: Whether ransomware groups exploit it
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:238
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      print(f"Ransomware-associated:         {(df['ransomware_use'] == 'Known').sum()}")
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:256
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      4. Pay special attention to KEV entries flagged with "Known Ransomware Campaign Use"
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:265
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - Ignoring the "ransomware use" field which indicates highest-urgency threats
      quoted

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_ai_rmf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "atlas_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 85Steps. 33 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2347 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 403: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 17 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 33 items
    • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.