CC performing-threat-emulation-with-atomic-red-team
Executes Atomic Red Team tests for MITRE ATT&CK technique validation using the atomic-operator Python framework. Loads test definitions from YAML atomics, runs attack simulations, and validates detection coverage. Use when testing SIEM detection rules, validating EDR coverage, or conducting purple team exercises.
Executes Atomic Red Team tests for MITRE ATT&CK technique validation using the atomic-operator Python framework.
As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 7
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 7
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellreferences/api-reference.md:31Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill)IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{url}')security skill -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# API Reference: Performing Threat Emulation with Atomic Red Team
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:65Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Atomic Red Team: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)description: 'Executes Atomic Red Team tests for MITRE ATT&CK technique validation
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:48Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Performing Threat Emulation with Atomic Red Team
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:53Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- When conducting security assessments that involve performing threat emulation with atomic red team
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:67Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Use atomic-operator to execute Atomic Red Team tests and validate detection coverage
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_ai_rmf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "atlas_techniques" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 13 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 388 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 314: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 5 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
- +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.