BC profiling-threat-actor-groups
Develops comprehensive threat actor profiles for APT groups, criminal organizations, and hacktivist collectives by aggregating TTP documentation, historical campaign data, tooling fingerprints, and attribution indicators from multiple intelligence sources. Use when briefing executives on sector-specific threats, updating threat model assumptions, or prioritizing defensive controls against specific adversaries. Activates for requests involving MITRE ATT&CK Groups, Mandiant APT profiles, CrowdStrike adversary naming, or sector-specific threat briefings.
Develops comprehensive threat actor profiles for APT groups, criminal organizations, and hacktivist collectives by aggregating TTP documentation, historical…
As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, running it twice
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:107Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)- Compensating controls where detection is not feasible (network segmentation as mitigation for lateral movement)
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:142Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- **Neglecting insider and criminal groups**: Overemphasis on nation-state APTs while ignoring ransomware groups (Cl0p, LockBit, ALPHV) which represent higher probability threats for most organization
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 85Steps. 27 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1581 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 557: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 12 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 27 items
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.