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Use at the START of any bug bounty hunting session, when switching targets, or when feeling lost about what to do next.

sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills Agent Skills author: sickn33 MIT 2 files body ≈ 5 181 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Use at the START of any bug bounty hunting session, when switching targets, or when feeling lost about what to do next.

As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers

ProcedureSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
57/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Failures and branches w 10
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 2 more places: agentic-awesome-skills, agentic-awesome-skills

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 6
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/details.md:32
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    - Status-code-only claims (e.g. "Host header X gave 200 instead of 403") are the most common rejected-as-N/A category on bug bounty platforms.
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:3
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    description: Use at the START of any bug bounty hunting session, when switching targets,
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:32
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    # Bug Bounty Methodology: Workflow + Mindset
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:48
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | **Bug bounty** (H1 / Bugcrowd / Intigriti / private VDP) | Impact-demonstrated bugs ONLY. Full chain to attacker-attainable harm. | Eligibility depends on the actual program; hygiene or disclosure m
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:49
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | **Red team** (external client engagement) | Hygiene findings + recon + IoCs + defensive-state observations are ALL deliverables | Deliverables depend on the rules of engagement; a negative test is a
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:50
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | **Pentest** (signed SoW / WAPT) | Depends on SoW. Read scope explicitly. Usually accepts hygiene + impact + recon | Out-of-scope assets, unsigned testing |

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5181 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "risk"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_repo"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_type"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "date_added"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "license_source"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "sources"
  • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 93): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5181 tokens
  • 85Steps. 71 steps, 2 vague phrases
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 119: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 33 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 71 items
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.