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AD firmware-pentest

Firmware penetration testing following the OWASP FSTM nine-stage flow: extraction, EMBA automation, Firmadyne/QEMU emulation, AFL++ fuzzing, and hands-on exploitation in authorized labs.

sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills Agent Skills author: sickn33 MIT 4 files body ≈ 2 386 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Firmware penetration testing following the OWASP FSTM nine-stage flow: extraction, EMBA automation, Firmadyne/QEMU emulation, AFL++ fuzzing, and hands-on…

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerGitHubSecuritySoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
92
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 2 more places: agentic-awesome-skills, agentic-awesome-skills

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 8

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 8
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/emulation-and-fuzz.md:259
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo python3 fuzz_httpd.py
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/emulation-and-fuzz.md:266
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # pwntools 生成 reverse shell
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/extraction-methodology.md:115
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo dd if=root…fs2 of=/dev/mtdblock0
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:2
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      name: firmware-pentest
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:3
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      description: "Firmware penetration testing following the OWASP FSTM nine-stage flow: extraction, EMBA automation, Firmadyne/QEMU emulation, AFL++ fuzzing, and hands-on exploitation in authorized labs.
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:26
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # 固件 / IoT 渗透链 (Firmware Pentest)
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:50
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (documentation table row)
      | 仿真起来后做 Web/RCE 利用 | `pentest-tools/`、`attack-chain/` |
      table
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:190
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # pwntools 生成 MIPS reverse shell

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "risk"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_repo"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_type"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "date_added"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "license_source"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 36 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2386 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 186: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 26 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 36 items
    • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.