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CB hunt-rce

Hunting skill for rce vulnerabilities. Built from 67 public bug bounty reports. Use when hunting rce on any target.

sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills Agent Skills author: sickn33 MIT 2 files body ≈ 5 266 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Hunting skill for rce vulnerabilities.

As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: running it twice

ProcedureKubernetesSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
76
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
67/100
Nearly there
Running it twice w 4
30
When it triggers w 12
50
Failures and branches w 10
55
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 2 more places: agentic-awesome-skills, agentic-awesome-skills

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 6
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/details.md:13
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    Describe demonstrated impact and separately label potential impact; do not extract real secrets or data to maximize severity. Potential impacts include: source code exfiltration, credential theft (dat
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/details.md:24
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    An attacker with a low-privileged "Management Console Editor" account on a GitHub Enterprise Server instance identified that the syslog-ng configuration UI accepted a free-form "destination" field. By
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/details.md:74
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - **B.** Recover the `<machineKey>` validationKey — via config leak (`/web.config` accessible), via subdomain takeover of a sibling app sharing the key, or via the CVE-…771 ToolShell exploit cha
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:3
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    description: Hunting skill for rce vulnerabilities. Built from 67 public bug bounty
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:58
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    RCE vulnerabilities command the highest payouts in bug bounty programs because they grant attackers direct execution control over target infrastructure. The highest-value targets are:
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:61
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - **Enterprise server products** (GitHub Enterprise Server, self-hosted GitLab) — privilege escalation chains from low-privileged console roles to root SSH access consistently pay critical/high

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5266 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "risk"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_repo"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_type"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "date_added"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "license_source"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "sources"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "report_count"

Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100

  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5266 tokens
  • 85Steps. 46 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 115: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 33 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 46 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (24 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.