BB 007
Security audit, hardening, threat modeling (STRIDE/PASTA), Red/Blue Team, OWASP checks, code review, incident response, and infrastructure security for any project.
Security audit, hardening, threat modeling (STRIDE/PASTA), Red/Blue Team, OWASP checks, code review, incident response, and infrastructure security for any…
As a process B 76/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, progress reporting
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: 007 (sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills)
How to improve
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 19
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 19
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/ai-agent-security.md:469Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- **Monthly**: Red team exercise with creative attack scenarios
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low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalreferences/api-security-patterns.md:17Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)GET /api/data?api_key=sk-l…456
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/detailed-guide.md:80Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Mapeamento -> Threat Model -> Checklist -> Red Team -> Blue Team -> Veredito
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/detailed-guide.md:215Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## Fase 4: Red Team Mental (Ataque Realista)
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/incident-playbooks.md:127Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## Playbook 3: Ransomware
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/incident-playbooks.md:136Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)- [ ] Block lateral movement (disable SMB, RDP between segments)
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/incident-playbooks.md:141Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [ ] Identify the ransomware variant (check ransom note, file extensions)
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/incident-playbooks.md:391Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)| **CRITICAL** | Data breach, ransomware, active exploitation | < 15 min | Immediate: CEO, CTO, Legal |
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/owasp-checklists.md:33Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| **API5** | **Broken Function Level Authorization** | Missing authorization checks on administrative or privileged API functions. | `DELETE /api/users/{id}` accessible to regular users; admin endpoin -
low Instruction override
en-ignore-previousreferences/owasp-checklists.md:46Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions") (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)| **LLM01** | **Prompt Injection** | Attacker manipulates LLM via crafted input (direct) or poisoned context (indirect). | User input contains "ignore previous instructions"; external documents with h
tablesecurity skill -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/stride-pasta-guide.md:221Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Existing findings: penetration test reports, bug bounty reports
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:14Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- pentest
A further 7 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 16. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "risk" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "source" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "date_added" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "tools"
Process rating: all ten parameters 76/100
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 12 steps
- 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 307 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +4No input/output examples
- -34 of 4 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 164: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 5 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 6)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.