CC incident-response
Handle security incidents with IR playbooks and procedures.
Handle security incidents with IR playbooks and procedures.
As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 5
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 5
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medium Exfiltration
exfil-read-secret-filesSKILL.md:133Reads credential / secret files (documentation of a security skill)cat /etc/shadow > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/shadow.txt" 2>/dev/null || true
security skill -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/details.md:85Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Cannot access compromised system | System encrypted by ransomware | Use offline disk imaging; restore from backups |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:79Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Critical (P1) | Active data breach, full outage, ransomware | Immediate (< 15 min) | Data exfiltration in progress, ransomware spreading |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:320Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Search for privilege escalation
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:339Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# --- Malware analysis ---
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "risk" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "source" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "source_repo" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "source_type" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "date_added" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "license_source"
Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 6 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3580 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 59: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 14 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 6 items
- +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.