BC malware-analyst
Expert malware analyst specializing in defensive malware research, threat intelligence, and incident response. Masters sandbox analysis, behavioral analysis, and malware family identification.
Expert malware analyst specializing in defensive malware research, threat intelligence, and incident response.
As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, failures and branches, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-persistenceSKILL.md:76Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)Registry Run keys - HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
security skill -
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-persistenceSKILL.md:82Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)Startup folder - %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
security skill -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:186Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Malware Analysis Report
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "risk" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "source" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "date_added"
Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 85Steps. 69 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Result and completion. Output format and completion criterion are stated
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1632 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 192: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 16 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 69 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.