SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

BD report-writing

Bug bounty report writing for H1/Bugcrowd/Intigriti/Immunefi

sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills Agent Skills author: sickn33 MIT 2 files body ≈ 3 049 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 23 h ago

Bug bounty report writing for H1/Bugcrowd/Intigriti/Immunefi

As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

GeneratorSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
47/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: report-writing (sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills)

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/details.md:109
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **`redteam-report-template`** — When the engagement is an external red team (NOT bug bounty). Workflow primitive: confirm engagement mode via `bb-methodology` PART 0; if red-team, swap this skill ou
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:3
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      description: Bug bounty report writing for H1/Bugcrowd/Intigriti/Immunefi
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:48
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Stored XSS in profile bio field executes in admin panel — allows privilege escalation
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:338
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Privilege escalation from user to admin
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:361
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      2. Allows account takeover or privilege escalation?             → +2 severity

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "risk"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_repo"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_type"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "date_added"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "license_source"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "sources"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 31 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3049 tokens
    • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 60: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 23 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 31 items
    • +4Has examples (18 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.