BC timesfm-forecasting
Zero-shot time series forecasting with Google's TimesFM foundation model. Use for any univariate time series (sales, sensors, energy, vitals, weather) without training a custom model. Supports CSV/DataFrame/array inputs with point forecasts and prediction intervals. Includes a preflight system checker script to verify RAM/GPU before first use.
Zero-shot time series forecasting with Google's TimesFM foundation model.
As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Read Write Edit Bash
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-autorun-instructionSKILL.md:371Instructs the agent to auto-run a script on every session1. **Not running system check** → model load crashes on low-RAM machines. Always run `check_system.py` first.
Files scanned: 27. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 85Steps. 40 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3713 tokens
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- -212 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 345: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 27 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 40 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (16 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (7 of 7)
- +3All 2 scripts are documented
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 93.