SKILLEMALL.ai
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CC schematics

Creates or refines publication-quality technical diagrams with the native generate_image tool (Nano Banana Pro through Ace or a Gemini key, GPT Image 2 through an OpenAI key), method and architecture overviews, pipelines, CONSORT and PRISMA flows, experimental workflows, biological pathways, circuits and conceptual schematics, described component by component, rendered under publication standards, scored against a document-type threshold and re-rendered once from the critique. Use for any figure whose content is structure rather than data. Not for plots of measured numbers (use figures) and not for illustrations or artwork (use generate-image). Never hand-drawn as TikZ or SVG.

synthetic-sciences/OpenScience Agent Skills author: synthetic-sciences Apache-2.0 7 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 2 183 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Creates or refines publication-quality technical diagrams with the native generateimage tool (Nano Banana Pro through Ace or a Gemini key, GPT Image 2 through…

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

GeneratorAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc references/review-loop.md:205
      Writes to a shell startup file
      echo 'export OPENROUTER_API_KEY="sk-o…key"' >> ~/.zshrc
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/generate_schematic_ai.py:45
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment

    Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "summary"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "role"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 16 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2183 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • -32 of 3 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 685: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 5 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.