SKILLEMALL.ai

CC referral-program

Referral and affiliate program design covering referral loop architecture, incentive design, trigger moment optimization, viral coefficient modeling, affiliate program structure, and optimization playbook.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
borghei/Claude-Skills Agent Skills author: borghei 8 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 1 682 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 7 h ago

Referral and affiliate program design covering referral loop architecture, incentive design, trigger moment optimization, viral coefficient modeling…

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

ProcedureData and analyticsMarketingPeople and hiringtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
88
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Result and completion w 14
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:73
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    **Limitations:** K-factor benchmarks assume consumer or prosumer SaaS; B2B enterprise referral programs have different dynamics (lower K but higher per-referral value). Affiliate commission benchmarks

Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 85Steps. 32 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1682 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 205: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 8 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 32 items
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.