SKILLEMALL.ai

CD malware-analyst

Expert malware analyst specializing in defensive malware research, threat intelligence, and incident response. Masters sandbox analysis, behavioral analysis, and malware family identification. Handles static/dynamic analysis, unpacking, and IOC extraction. Use PROACTIVELY for malware triage, threat hunting, incident response, or security research.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Solomon Neas v1.0.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 1 552 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 6 d ago

Expert malware analyst specializing in defensive malware research, threat intelligence, and incident response.

As a process D 45/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

AnalyzerSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
86
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
45/100
Unfinished process
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:79
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      Registry Run keys       - HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:85
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      Startup folder         - %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security skill-card.md:3
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Provides defensive malware analysis guidance for triage, static and dynamic analysis, unpacking, IOC extraction, and incident-response reporting.
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security skill-card.md:17
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      Security analysts, incident responders, and threat researchers use this skill for authorized malware triage, static and dynamic analysis planning, IOC extraction, and report preparation. It should be 
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security skill-card.md:27
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Mitigation: Use only for authorized defensive malware analysis in a dedicated, revertible sandbox or isolated VM with controlled networking and no shared host folders or credentials.
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:189
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Malware Analysis Report

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 45/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (malware-analyst) differs from the folder (s3-malware-analyst)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 85Steps. 66 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1552 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 349: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 66 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This defensive malware-analysis skill is not malicious, but it should be reviewed because it tells agents to run malware samples while its scope and safety controls are incomplete.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 12 Sept 2026