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DD heartflow-engine

统一整合版：claude-heartflow-skill (v2.8.0) + mark-heartflow-skill (v5.7.3) 290+ 模块，25 个 MCP 工具，零外部依赖，覆盖认知/记忆/情绪/哲学/自愈/决策/代码/意识。 **需要用户明确授权的能力：** - 代码执行 (new Function / execSync / child_process) - 文件系统写入 (writeFileSync / mkdirSync) - 环境变量访问 (process.env) 无自动网络通信，无遥测，无外部数据发送。

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: yun520-1 v5.8.6 MIT-0 80 files body ≈ 1 209 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

统一整合版：claude-heartflow-skill (v2.8.0) + mark-heartflow-skill (v5.7.3) 290+ 模块，25 个 MCP 工具，零外部依赖，覆盖认知/记忆/情绪/哲学/自愈/决策/代码/意识。 需要用户明确授权的能力： - 代码执行 (new Function /…

As a process D 45/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorGitHubAI and agentsResearchtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
43/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
26
Quality 40%
69
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
45/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs src/code/code-executor.js:92
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (code comment)
    /rm\s+-rf\s+\//i,            // rm -rf /
    comment
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs src/code/code-executor.js:94
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (code comment)
    /rm\s+-r\s+\*/i,            // rm -r /*
    comment
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs src/code/code-executor.js:116
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (code comment)
    />\s*\/dev\/sda/i,           // > /dev/sda
    comment
Medium and low: 4
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell src/code/code-executor.js:106
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment)
    /curl\s+\|\s*bash/i,       // curl | bash
    comment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell src/code/code-executor.js:107
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment)
    /wget\s+\|\s*(bash|sh)/i,  // wget | bash/sh
    comment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell src/code/code-executor.js:114
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment)
    /wget\s+.*\|\s*(bash|sh)/i, // wget ... | bash
    comment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell src/code/code-executor.js:115
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment)
    /curl\s+.*\|\s*(bash|sh)/i, // curl ... | bash
    comment

Files scanned: 80. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "title"

Process rating: all ten parameters 45/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (heartflow-engine) differs from the folder (heartflow-v5)
  • 75Steps. 3 steps
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1209 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -223 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 271: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 3 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This looks like a broad local AI helper, but it under-discloses external API use, local server behavior, and privileged runtime features.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 10 Jul 2026